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JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
"C IVIL RIGHTS" as the term is used in America today is of wide and ill-defined meaning. American courts 
define the term to include "all rights which the law gives a 
person which depend upon the community in which he 
lives"' and seldom place emphasis upon Locke's idea that 
they are categorical absolutes derived from the immutable 
law of nature.Vhi1e the expression is apparently indigenous 
to America, such concepts, of course, antedate American 
history and owe their origin to the Stoic philosophy and their 
growth to Chri~tianity.~ More recent antecedents include 
Magna Carta and the English Petition and Bill of Right. 
Any survey of the judicial history of civil rights must for 
brevity be limited to focal points of interest. This paper 
treats constitutional background and provisions; then con- 
siders cases on religious matters, suffrage, rights of persons 
accused of crime, segregation in carriers, education, and resi- 
dential ownership, aliens, and certain limits on free speech, 
Constitutional Prowisions and Nationalization of Civil Rights 
The United States Constitution is more noted for its lack 
of provisions for civil rights than for its safeguards. Aside 
from guaranteeing the writ of habeas corpus," outlawing bills 
of attaindeP and ex post facto laws: and setting minimum 
standards for punishment of treason,' no other civil rights are 
mentioned in the body of the Constitution. The PhiIadelphia 
Fathers did not forget about a bill of rights; they thought 
about and rejected it.8 If the new government was to have 
only the powers specifically granted, and none of such powers 
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gave it authority over the areas which a federal Bill of Rights 
would protect, why declare the thing shall not be done which 
there is no delegated power to do? The founders, however, 
misjudged the temper of the country, and it was not until a 
bill of rights in the form of amendments had been pron~ised 
that the constitution received ratification.'' The Bill of Rights 
was set up to protect the civil liberties of the people against 
invasion by the new federal government. I t  was intended to 
restrict Congress, the president, and the federal courts, and 
did not apply to the states. Tlle framers regarded state inter- 
ference with civil liberty as outside the scope of their con- 
cern. Not until 1833, however, did the Supreme Court, speak- 
ing through John Marshall, in the case of Barron us Balti- 
more,1° confirm this view. There the City of Baltimore, in 
paving streets, diverted a natural water course leaving 
Bal-son's wharf inaccessible. Barron contended that he was 
protected under the Fifth Amendment, which forbids the 
taking of private property for public use without just com- 
pensation. But Marshall said that the language of the first 
eight amendments shows a complete demonstration that they 
apply solely to the United States government and not the 
states, and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
Quite clearly, then, until the Civil War, states could with 
impunity deprive citizens of many civil rights toclay regarded 
as basic. 
The nationalization of our civil rights is primarily a history 
of the Civil War amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, 
which provides that "No State shall deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law." In the 
renowned SZa~~ghterhouse Cdses (1873)" i t  was not the 
freedman or the white Unionist who first invoked the Four- 
teenth Amendment, but a group of ex-Confederates who 
Judicial Highlights of Civil Rights 77 
were aroused over a particularly odious Carpet Bag adminis- 
tration. The Republican legislature of Louisiana, ostensibly 
as a health measure, passed an act incorporating and mo- 
nopolizing for 25 years a slaughterhouse in New Orleans. 
These former competitors claimed their privileges and im- 
munities as citizens of the United States against the mo- 
nopoly. Such privileges and immunities, they contended, 
guaranteed a system of economic laissez-faire. The Court 
paid little regard to the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; then drew an un- 
expected construction of the privileges and immunities 
clause, which virtually cut the heart from the Reconstruc- 
tion amendments. The Amendment, observed the Court, pro- 
vides that no State shall make any law abridging privileges 
of citizens of the United States. The Court then distinguished 
state and national citizenship, pointing out that each carried 
with it certain incidents. Without defining the privileges in- 
cident to national citizenship, it was remarked that free 
access to seaports and protection of life on the high seas 
would be among them. But the Court held that a state could 
make or ellforce a law that would abridge the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the state. 
Ten years later in the Civil Rights Cases (1883),12 the 
court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which had forbidden proprietors 
of public conveyances, hotels, restaurants, and places of 
anlusement to refuse accommodations to any person because 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Court 
held the act void, saying that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids only undue racial discrimination when practiced by 
the state itself, and not by individuals. 
Thus the enervated amendments remained until a xemark- 
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able about-face a half-century later. In GitZow 08. New York 
(1925),13 the constitutionality of a New York statute making it 
a criminal offense to advocate overthrow of the government 
was challenged. Gitlow contended that the State of New 
York was depriving him of liberty without due process of law, 
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court pro- 
ceeded to hold the statute as applicable to Gitlow valid, and 
affirmed his conviction, it did make the following unprece- 
dented remark: 
'%or present purposes we may and do assume that freedom 
of speech and of press which are protected by the First 
Amendment from abridgement by Congress are among the 
fundamenta1 personal rights and liberties protected by the 
Due Process clause of the For~rteenth Amendment from im- 
pairment by the state." 
A few years later the Court actually held that freedom of 
speech was within the compass of the Fourteenth Arnend- 
rnents1"n 1937 in DeJonge us. Oregon,'j it was further held 
that right to peaceable assembly was "liberty" within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; then in 1940 in 
Cantwell us. Connecticut,16 it was held that freedom of re- 
ligion fell within its orbit; and in 1941 in Bridges vs. Cali- 
fornia," it was held that the right to petition for redress of 
grievances was also included. 
- 
Even so, the liberties protected against state encroachment 
by the Fourteenth Amendment do not parallel those pro- 
tected from federal encroachment by the Bill of Rights. For 
in 1937 in Palko us. Connecticat,18 the provision that a state 
could appeal from an unfavorable decision and thus put a 
defendant twice in jeopardy was held not contrary to the 
United States Constitution. Surely if the criminal can appeal 
when he loses, the Court observed, the edifice of justice may 
stand in even greater symmetry by allowing the state to do so 
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where a mistake of law has been made in the lower court. 
There was weighty precedent for such a view, for in the lead- 
ing case of Twining vs. New Jersey (1908),lS the Court had 
held that a state might modify or completely abolish trial by 
jury. Even before, in Hurtado us. California (1884)," the 
Supreme Court had held that California's conviction on 
methods other than grand jury indictment was sustainable. 
Further inroads on state action have been made, however. 
In 1947 in Adamson us. California,2' the prosecuting counsel 
was allowed to comment on the failure of the defendant to 
deny or explain evidence in a criminal case. The majority 
stuck to the traditional view that the privilege against self- 
incrimination might even be withdrawn by the state and the 
accused put on the stand as the prosecution's witness. But 
Mr. Justice Black, with the concurrence of three other mem- 
bers of the Court, voiced his strong dissent: "My study of the 
historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment," commented Justice Black, "ahd the expressions of those 
who sponsored and favored it, as well as those who opposed 
its submission and passage, persuades me that one of the chief 
objects . . . [it was] intended to accomplish was to make the 
Bill of Rights applicable to the states. With full knowledge of 
the import of the Balron decision, the framers and backers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to 
overturn the constitutional rule that case had announced." 
Later that year, he was called upon to reiterate his dissent 
when, in Foster us. Illinois (1947),22 the Court held the Four- 
teenth Amendment had not been breached when a state de- 
nied counsel to defendants who entered pleas of guilty. 
The Court stood firm, however, in its most recent expres- 
sion in Wolf us. People of Cobrado (1949).'3 There a state + 
conviction for a state offense was had by use of evidence ob- 
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tained under circumstances which would have rendered it 
inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in 
a court of the United States (because there deemed an 
infraction of the Fourth Amendment forbidding unlawful 
searches and seizures), Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded the 
issue for the majority as follows: "The notion that the 'due 
process of law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is 
shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution 
and thereby incorporates them has been rejected again 
and again after impressive consideration. . . . The issue is 
closed." Yet three judges dissented and another (Black), 
while concurring in the result, restate his stand in the Adam- 
&on case. 
With this delicijte balance, the minority view today could 
easily be tomorrow's rule. The untimely loss of Justices Rut- 
ledge and Murphy (who dissented in the Wolf case) would 
seem to insure that the majority stand is not yet weakened, 
however. 
Religious Cases 
Turning to religious cases and the First Amendment as it 
relates to freedom of religion, the Jehoval-is TVitnesses have 
done more than all other groups combined to formulate the 
law on its interpretation. Within eight years, they reached 
the Supreme Court on twenty major cases, and won fourteen. 
The Witnesses are an aggressive sect, preaching the second 
coming of Christ, insisting that each person is a minister of 
the gospel, and attacking organized religion in churches, 
especially the Roman Catholic Church. 
In Love11 us. Griffin (1938),24 a unanimous Court held an 
ordinance of the Town of Griffin, Georgia, prohibiting distri- 
bution of pamphlets without censorship of the city manager, 
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to be invalid on its face. A Connecticut statute requiring 
prior approval of the Secretary of Public Welfare before soli- 
citation for religious purposes met a similar fate in Cantwell 
us. Connecticut (1940),25 Later, a city ordinance was passed 
making it illegal to ring a doorbell to summon an occupant to 
the door to give hlin a hand bill. On challenge by the Wit- 
nesses, the Court held that freedom of speech and press had 
been violated." 
In 1942, opponents of the Witnesses must have felt some 
relief in having upheld a license tax imposed on peddlers." 
The relief was short-lived, for the Court reversed itself the 
next year saying that the Witnesses were engaged in a re- 
ligious activity, and not a commercial enterprise, and there- 
fore the license tax as applied to them was invalid.28 In Marsh 
us. Alabama (1946)2D the Court upheld the right of Witnesses 
to distribute literature in a company-owned town, and the 
same year in Tucker us. Texas,g0 the Court upheld the right of 
religious solicitation in a United States-owned housing proj- 
ect, I t  has, however, been held valid for fees to be imposed 
upon, them for the extra police service necessitated by their 
presence. 
During the war years came the renoivned flag saluting cases, 
perhaps more famous for the Court's direct reversal of itself 
than for the principles involved. The Witnesses refused to 
salute the flag on the basis of a passage from Exodus 20 
which says, "Thou shall not make unto thee any graven 
image." In Miszersuille School Dist. us. Gobitis (1940),S1 the 
Court held that legislation aimed at securing national unity 
was of paramount importance, and allowed enforcement of 
the policy. Three years later came West  Virginia Board of 
Education us. Bamette (1943)32 after the composition of the 
Court had changed by one member. The five-to-four deci- 
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sion of the Gobitb case was reversed and the Court remarked 
that "a person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into 
it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's 
jest and scorn." 
The pillars of Jefferson's "wall of separation" between 
church and state have been shaken in two recent cases. In 
Everson Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947),33 a 
New Jersey statute which authorized local school districts to 
make contracts for transportation of their children to and 
from schools was challenged. Part of the money was for the 
payment of transportation of some children in the commu- 
nity to Catholic parochial schools. The taxpayers filed a suit in 
the state court challenging the right of the Board to reim- 
burse parents of parochial school students. The Due Process 
argument was used: that some were being taxed for the 
private benefits of others; but stronger emphasis was laid on 
the First Amendment, in that such practice constituted sup- 
port of a religion by the state. Surely the decision will al- 
ways be outstanding as a commentary on church-state di- 
vision, if not for its holding. By a five-to-four decision in 
which four opinions were written, the tax was upheld, Jus- 
tice Jackson, attacking the majority for their ultimate holding, 
after prefatory remarks on the wisdom of church-state divi- 
sion said that "the case which irresistibly comes to mind as 
the most fitting precedent [for their opinion] is that of Julia 
who, according to Byron's report, 'whispering I will ne'er con- 
sent, consented.' " 
In McCollunz vs. Board of Edacation (1948),34 teaching re- 
ligion in public schools was challenged. Active members in 
the community of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and some 
Protestant faiths formed a council of religious education and 
obtained pern~ission of the Board of Education to offer 
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classes for each. Students were excused from their secular 
study on condition they attend religious classes. The Court 
held the plan contrary to the first Amendment, saying that 
neither a state nor the federal government can set up a 
church, and neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
Justice Frankfurter observed that the students could be let 
out early to participate in religious activity, but state facil- 
ities must not be used. The loan of textbooks to parochial 
schools has been approved under some conditions,s5 however, 
and the National School Lunch Act3' does not exclude re- 
ligious schools. Despite compulsory educational laws, it has 
also been held that children may attend parochial schools 
which meet proper educational standards.37 
There is little judicial expression on suffrage in the early 
history of our country, since all of the states imposed property 
qualifications, and since suffrage was regarded as a privilege 
and not a right, John Adams expressed the popular thought of 
the time in stating that allowing non-property-holders to vote 
"tends to confound and destroy all distinctions and prostrate 
all ranks to one common level." Chancellor Kent also ob- 
served that "no voting quaucation would be unfavorable to 
the security of the property." Universal suffrage, even in 
England, was not to come until the next century. It is not 
uncommon even during this decade for a court to classify 
suffrage as a "political privilege7' and not one of the civil or 
natural rights.38 I t  is not surprising then, that the Constitu- 
tion provides that the time, place, and manner of electing 
even federal officers shall be regulated by the ~tates.~" 
The Fifteenth Anlendment, which provides that no person 
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shall be denied the right to vote because of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude, is said to confer the right 
to vote on no one;*O it merely creates a right to freedom from 
discrimination. As a result, the states in the exercise of their 
power to prescribe voting qualifications have been able to 
discriminate against the characteristics which the Negro pos- 
sesses. In Williams us. Mississippi (1898)41 it was required that 
all persons who were qualified to vote must be able to read 
and write and interpret the state constitution. In the hands 
of white officials, this last requirement could become onerous 
indeed. The results were those desired. The Court upheld 
them on attack under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Unfortunately for those policy-makers, not a few illiterate 
whites were also excluded by the above provisions, so that 
"grandfather clauses" were placed in the state constitutions, 
providing that such rigid standards were not required of 
those who were lineal descendants of persons who could vote 
on January 1,1867. They temporarily served their purp~se,~" 
although the most recent grandfather clause in the Constitu- 
tion of Oklahoma was held unconstitutional in 1915.43 
Perhaps the most useful device for depriving the Negro of 
suffrage in the South, apart from the grandfather clause, has 
come with the white primary. In 1921 in the case of New- 
berry us. the defendant was accused of violating the 
Federal Cormpt Practices Act by excessive expenditures in a 
primary election. Ironically the outspent opponent was 
Henry Ford. Newberry challenged the constitutionality of the 
Act on the basis that Congress had no power to control pri- 
maries since they were not elections. Since the justices split 
four to four in their decision, Newbeny was acquitted; but 
the question of the extent of the power of Congress over 
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primaries was left unsettled. The impression prevailed, how- 
ever, that Congress could not regulate them. 
Then came an interesting series of cases from Texas, In 
1927 in the case of Nixon us. Hernd~n,'~ an El Paso Negro 
physician challenged a Texas statute providing that political 
parties in Texas could provide qualifications for those who 
could vote in primaries. The Supreme Court held such pro- 
vision was 'state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and did not even consider the Fifteenth. 
Texas then changed the statute, and to prevent state ac- 
tion, simply gave power to the State Executive Committee of 
every political party to determine its own membership. Of 
course, they limited it to white Democrats. Nixon again chal- 
lenged this provision on the basis that the Executive Com- 
mittee was simply an agency of the State and was bound 
by all the same provisions. Again in Nixon us. Condon 
(1932)"' he prevailed, 
Texas then fell back to its old expedient of using the white 
primary and letting the convention en masse determine the 
policy and the membership. They, in turn, excluded Negroes. 
In Grove y us. Townsend (1935)47 the Supreme Court sustained 
such policy, saying that exclusion from a primary was tanta- 
mount tci denying party membership, which was permissible. 
Wedged between this case and the Houston case of Smith us. 
Allright" in in944 came the case of U.S. us. Classic (194L)40 
in which a Louisiana politician had flagrantly violated all elec- 
tion laws in a Louisiana primary by buying votes and hav- 
ing them illegally counted. He was convicted under the En- 
forcement Act of 1870, but appealed on the basis that Con- 
gress had no power to legislate with regard toprirnaries, as did 
Newberry. The Court rejected his view, however, and held 
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that where a party primaiy is an integral part of the procedure 
of election, Congress can control it under the Constitution. 
In Smith us. Allright, supra, a Houston Negro sued an 
election official for damages in being denied the right to cast 
his ballot. The federal court here dismissed the action, but on 
appeal the United States Supreme Court specifically over- 
ruled Grmey us. Townsend and held that the primary was a 
state function, and that in Texas it was a vital part of the 
eIection machinery of the State. 
After Smith us. Allright, the State of South Carolina re- 
pealed eveiything in its Constitution and laws referring to 
a primary. The democratic party then attempted to deter- 
mine tl~rough w11olly internal action who could vote in the 
primary. This effort was flustrated by the decision in Rice 
us. Elmore (1941)." The United States Supreme Court re- 
fused to review t l ~ e  decision. Obviously, if a state legislature 
could vitiate rights guaranteed by the Constitution by aban- 
doning state functions to a private organization, it is arguable 
that no guarantee would standa6' The Court also followed 
a new test in determining application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: "state function" seems to replace the "state 
action" test laid clou711 in the Civil Rights Cases. 
The Democratic Party then attempted to organize itself 
into a private club and determine the qualifications for 
menlbership, excluding those who did not meet its standards. 
By more than coinciclence, the standards would have ex- 
cluded Negroes, On attack, this effort also failed in Brown 
us. Bnskin (19~19)~~ where the district judge gave the party 
leaders in South Carolina a scathing lecture. 
The poll tax, once a vital weapon for controlling suffrage, 
now exists in only six states. Those who retain it recognize the 
social problem involved where, as in Birmingham, Alabama, 
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and throughout Mississippi, poorly qualified Negroes com- 
pose over fifty per cent of the population. The poll tax, at 
least once upheld in the Supreme Court, has not recentIy 
been 
Rights of Persons Accused of Crime 
No government known has provided more safeguards to 
the accused than America. Unreasonable searches and sei- 
zures, appointment of counseI, jury trial, compulsory self-in- 
crinlination, and interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
have been focal points of Constitutional controversy particu- 
larly since the Civil War. 
In the famous Olmstead case (1928)" where Seattle boot- 
leggers were making over $176,000 per month in their illicit 
traffic, the S~~preme Court was called upon to decide whether 
wire tapping constituted an unlawful search or seizure within 
the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment. Governmental 
agents had monitored telephone conversations over many 
weeks and had used the fmits of their wire tapping to obtain 
conviction. A divided Court held that wire tapping was not 
a search or seizure, although the use of evidence so obtained 
has been sharply curtailed by later legislation. In his usual 
succinct manner, Holmes drew the issues in his dissent: 
"There is no body of precedents by which we are bound and 
which confines us to logical deduction from established 
rules. Therefore we must consider the two objects of desire, 
both of which we cannot have, and make up our minds which 
to choose. I t  is desirable that criminals should be detected, 
and to that end that all available evidence should be used. 
I t  also is desirable that the government should not itself foster 
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which 
the evidence is to be obtained. . . . We have to choose and 
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for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should 
escape than that the government should play an ignoble 
part." 
In the Nardone case (1937)55 the Court was again called 
upon to decide whether evidence procured by a federal 
officer's tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages 
is admissible in a criminal trial, after the Federal Communi- 
cation Act of 1934 had provided that "no person not being 
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communica- 
tion. . . ." Quite obviously, information gained from wire tap- 
ping could lead investigators to discover other independent 
evidence sufficient for conviction apart from the tapped con- 
versation. The Court, however, held that not only is evidence 
obtained from the wire tapping inadmissible, Erut also the 
evidence procured through use of knowledge gained from 
tapping, it being "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden, 
however, is on the defendant to show such information was 
thus obtained. But the Court in Goldman us. United States . 
(1940)'' distinguishes the wire tapping cases from testimony 
overheard by another as it was spoken into the transmitter. I t  
has also been held that taking original statements into the 
telephone by a concealed detectaphone is permissible, there 
being no "interception" within the meaning of the Federal 
Communications ActTS7 
Searches and seizures without warrant have caused con- 
victions resting upon information thus obtained to be over- 
turned. Weeks us. United States (1914)" has stood as 'a lead- 
ing case holding that the immunity from unreasonable 
searches and seizures afforded by the United States Consti- 
tution had been denied the accused in a federal district 
court where the court refused the defendant return of his 
letters and private documents seized in his home during his 
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absence, by a United States marshal having no warrant. 
Before the Weeks decision, of twenty-seven states which 
had passed upon the admissibility of evidence obtained by 
unlawful search and seizure, twenty-six states had opposed 
the Weeks doctrine.'% Recently, in Wolf vs. People of CoZo- 
mdo (1949),"O the Court reaffirms the Weeks doctrine insofar 
as it applies to practice and convictions in federal courts, but 
held that, in a state conviction based upon evidence inad- 
missible under the federal rule, there was no denial of Due 
Process. Three justices dissented, and Justice Black, while 
concurring, felt that "a state o&cer7s knock at the door. . . as 
a preIude to a search without authority of law may be . . . 
just as ominous to ordered liberty as though the knock were 
made by a federal officer." 
In Ag~zello us. a i d e d  States (1925)01 where a legal seizure 
was made, and through such seizure it was apparent that 
smuggled dope was confined in another's house, a second 
arrest without warrant and not incidental to the first was 
illegal, and evidence so obtained could not be introduced. 
I t  has also been held in Lewis us. United States (1937)" that 
where a federal officer without warrant breaks into the home 
of one and discovers evidence fatal to another, the latter 
cannot complain, since his property has not been illegally 
broken. 
One court gave sanction ta a novel twist of the "unreason- 
able search" clause in recently holding that use of a stomach 
pump treatment which leads to the discovery of narcotics 
in the stomach of one charged with concealing them was un- 
reasonable so as to render testimony concerning possession 
thereof inadmissible.ss 
Cases are now numerous in requiring that a fair and im- 
partial trial be allowed the accused, and that evidence ob- 
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tabad by coercive methods should not be admissible. In the 
now famous McNabb cases (1943),"4 three brothers who were 
Tennessee mountaineers were accused of second degree mur- 
der when they shot the "revenuers." Evidence showed that 
the brothers had never been more than twenty-one miles 
away from the farm during their lives, and after arrest, they 
were thrown in a cell without cot or chair and were ques- 
tioned for hours without advice of counsel. The Supreme 
Court reversed a conviction in the trial court on the basis that 
defendants were compelled to give evidence against them- 
selves and were deprived of liberty without due process of 
law, 
Indeed, in their vigilance to outlaw easy but self-defeating 
ways of crime detection, the Court has virtually disallowed 
any confession made between arrest and arraignment.65 
On one day in 1949, the Court overturned three widely- 
separated state court convictions6' where the defendant had 
been held incommunicado for several days before commit- 
ment to a magistrate. While the trial courts and state supreme 
courts had found as a fact that the confessions were volun- 
tarily given, the Court refused to be ignorant as judges of 
what they know as men. "Ours is the accusatorial as opposed 
to the inquisitorial system,"67 observed Justice Frankfurter 
for the majority, and held that the prosecution must establish 
its case not by interrogation of the accused even under 
judicial safeguard, but by evidence independently secured 
through skillful investigation. Justice Jackson, mindful of the 
social implications of the majority view, wrote an appealing 
dissent to all three cases. "The seriousness of the Court's 
judgement is that no one suggests that any course held 
promise of solution of these murders other than to take the 
suspect into custody for questioning. The alternative was to 
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close the books on the crime and forget it, with the suspect 
a t  large. This is a grave choice for a society in which two- 
thirds of the murders already are closed out as in~oluble."~~ 
Mr. Jackson further observed that once a confession is ob- 
tained, its verity might be established by corroborating evi- 
dence, which existed in each of these cases. Three judges 
joined Jackson's dissent, and its strong social appeal may in 
time gain the following of the Court. 
Right of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment has 
also been reviewed in numerous cases, often to the advan- 
tage of the accused. In  Powell us. Alabama (1932),69 the 
Court found there was a duty to appoint counsel for the 
accused, but the doctrine was limited to capital cases of in- 
digent defendants incapable of hiring counsel or conducting 
their trials. In  Betts vs. Brady (1942)," the Court held that 
fadt~re of a state in a non-capital case to appoint counsel was 
not denial of Due Process finless specific prejudice was 
shown. Convictions have been reversed where the defendant 
had no counsel and the issues were complex,'' where the 
prosecution resorted to or where the partiality of 
the trial judge was shown.73 
Wude us. Mayu (1948)7%eld that where an individual by 
reason of age, ignorance, or mental capacities is incapable 
of representing himself even in a prosecution of a relatively 
simple nature, refusal to appoint counsel denies Due Process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Another 1948 case seems 
to make it clear that in every capital case, whether prejudicial 
influence is shown or not, the defendant is entitled to coun- 
sel." In 1949, the Court further held in Gibbs us. BurkeT6 
that failure to request counsel does not constitute a waiver 
when defendant does not know of the right. 
Laukiana ex re1 Francis us. Resweber (1947)77 brought an 
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interesting interpretation of the "double jeopardy" and "un- 
usual crimes and punishments" clauses. There a Negro boy 
who had been convicted in a Louisiana State court was given 
the death penalty and his warrant duly issued. While he was 
strapped in the electric chair, the switch failed because of 
a latent mechanical defect. On the second attempt, the de- 
fendant pleaded that he was placed twice in jeopardy and 
that his punishment was cruel and unusual in that he was 
enduring a double psychological strain in preparing twice 
for death. By a five-to-four decision, the Court refused both 
grounds, stating that there was no suggestion of malevolence, 
and likening the situation to a fire that might break out in 
one's cell. The dissent would have remanded the case for 
further investigation of the amount of electric current which 
passed through the defendant's body, in order to determine 
the question of jeopardy. 
Cases involving fair and impartial juries and Courts have 
also resulted in state court reversals. In Ex Parte Virginia 
(1880)," a Negro who was convicted by a jury composed of 
all whites pleaded that he was denied his liberty without Due 
Process and showed that the county judge had systematically 
excluded Negroes from the juiy panel. On the evidence, the 
Court sustained the defendant's position and stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had been violated, even though the 
judge had acted outside the scope of his duties as a state 
officer. But the Court showed that a Negro need not neces- 
sarily be on the jury for conviction of another Negro to stand; 
and in Akins us. Texas (1945),7D where the commissioner sys- 
tematically placed only one Negro on each jury panel, it was 
held equal protection had not been denied since no person 
is entitled to proportionate representation. 
In Mowe us. Denzpsey (1923),s0 where five Negroes were 
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convicted for murdering a white man, the evidence on appeal 
showed that a mob had assembled around the court house 
awaiting conviction. The Court observed that no one on the 
jury would have dared vote other than for conviction, else he 
would not escape the mob. This amounted to no trial at  all, 
said the Court, but was merely mob violence masquerading 
as such. 
In the 1947 case of Fay us. New Ymk,"' defendant chal- 
lenged the "Blue Ribbon Jury" used by New York in its 
state courts. Among other complaints, the county clerk 
selected the jury from the general panel, and women had 
the option of serving or not as they chose. The juries in prac- 
tice were far from being equally distributed between the 
sexes, but the Court held there was no denial of Due Process. 
Segregation in Public Carriers 
Enforced segregation in public carriers in the South was 
first challenged in the Ci&t Rights Cases mentioned above.82 
In Plessy us. Fergusm (1896)83 a Louisiana statute provided 
that all raiIroads should furnish separate and equal accommo- 
dations for white and colored races. In challenging the 
statute it was maintained that the enforced separation stamps 
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. The Court, how- 
ever, upheld the statute saying that if so, it was not because 
of anything in the Act, but solely because the colored race 
chose to put that construction upon it. The majority felt that 
racial prejudice could not be overcome by legislation or 
forced commingling and held that segregation was not dis- 
criminatory or unreasonable; all this being done, however, 
over the protest of Justice Harlan, a Southerner, who stated 
that "our Constitution is color blind." 
Previously, segregation on carriers had been challenged 
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under the commerce clause in Hall us. De C u i ~  (1877).84 The 
Court there invalidated the Louisiana statute which pre- 
scribed racial segregation on interstate carriers on the ground 
that uniformity of regulation was essential, that Congress 
had exclusive power to regulate, and that interstate com- 
merce must remain 'free and untrammeled." 
In Morgan us. Virginia. (1946)85 a Negro passenger on an 
interstate bus was arrested for refusing to change her seat in 
compIiance with the driver's direction pursuant to a Virginia 
statute. The Court held, consistently with the early De Cuir 
case, that the statutory requirement that passengers change 
seats from time to time, as it might become necessary to in- 
crease the seats available to one race or the other, constituted 
an undue burden on interstate commerce. 
However, in Day us. Attantic Greyhound Corporation 
(1948)8%e Fourth Circuit Court held that an interstate 
carrier has a right to establish rules and regulations which 
require white and colored passengers to occupy separate ac- 
commodations provided there is no discrimination in the ar- 
rangement, distinguishing the Morgan case where a State 
statute required the segregation. In 1938, an I.C.C. decision 
held that it was not unreasonable, in view of the paucity of 
Negro demand, that no pullman accommodations be fur- 
nished for Negroes.87 The day of air travel may require 
special doctrines on the law of segregation. 
Segregation i n  Education 
Much of the history on segregation in educational insti- 
tutions undoubtedly lies ahead. The leading case on the 
equal protection of the laws as applied to public education 
is Missouri ex re1 Gaines us. Canada (1938).88 There Gaines, 
a Negro graduate of Lincoln College, was refused admission 
to the University of Missouri Law School. Under Missouri 
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policy, the State made a practice of providing tuition for its 
colored citizens whereby they could obtain equal educational 
facilities in other states. But the Supreme Court held that 
such provision denied the applicant equal protection of the 
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said that 
Gaines was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the 
State University in the absence of other and proper provision 
for his legal training within the State. Thirty years prior the 
Court had recognized in Berea College us. Kentucky (1908)'' 
the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting private 
schools from admitting whites and blacks to the same institu- 
tion. 
In 1948, on the application of an Oklahoma Negress to the 
law school of her State University, the Court seemed to go 
slightly further than in the Gaines case. Chief Justice Vinson 
rendered a unanimous decisiong0 saying that "Ada Sipuel is 
entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state insti- 
tution. Oklahoma must provide it for her and provide it as 
soon as it does for applicants of any other group." Arkansas 
first met the problem by putting a colored student in an adja- 
cent room, then by moving him into the main classroom with 
a small fence around him, then finally by absorbing him into 
the group. 
In Sweatt us. Painter (1948)91 a Texas Appellate Court up- 
held the state laws which require segregation of races in 
state-supported schools, where substantially equal facilities 
for education exist for Negro students. The State Supreme 
Court refused writ of error, and the United States Supreme 
Court has set the case for hearing in April, 1950. 
Residential Segregationg2 
While a recent New York decisions3 has held that the right 
to acquire interests in real property cannot be classi£ied as a 
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civil right, residential segregation and restrictive convenants 
have been viewed by minority groups in the same light as 
other discriminations. Restrictive convenants against certain 
use of real property (as occupancy by members of designated 
races) have for years rested upon common law principles, 
with a distinction being drawn between use and owner- 
shipso4 
In Buchanan vs. Warley (1917),g5 the Court struck down an 
ordinance of Louisville, Kentucky, which forbade Negroes 
to move into any block wherein the greater number of houses 
were occupied by whites, and vice versa. The ordinance was 
challenged by a white owner who desired to convey a lot to a 
Negro. But this is a case of discrimination by city ordinance or 
governmental action. What if individual owners in a neigh- 
borhood agree to restrictive covenants whereby none shall 
sell to a Negro? In Corrigan us. Buckley (1926)96 the Supreme 
Court dismissed an appeal on the constitutionality of such 
provision, saying the question lacked "any substantial . . . 
color of merit." But this case concerned land in the District 
of Columbia, and could not possibly call into pIay the Four- 
teenth Amendment aimed at state action. 
In Shelley us. Kraemer (1948)97 and several companion 
cases, the Supreme Court answered the question whether 
state governments were participating in racial discrimination 
by lending aid of their courts in enforcement of restrictive 
covenants. Deciding in the affirmative, the Court ouilawed 
future enforcement of the covenants in state courts by say- 
ing: "It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights in- 
tended to be protected from discriminatory state action by 
the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, 
own, and dispose of property." The impact of these deci- 
sions has not been fully realized; almost all property in 
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Southern urban areas is subject to such convenants, and the 
question is posed whether a landowner whose property value 
is threatened by a neighbor's sale to a Negro in breach of the 
covenant can maintain an action for damages against him.g7a 
In any time of national crisis, the position of aliens in the 
country is extremely uncomfortable. The United States has 
not been without its problems in this regard. In the western 
part of the United States, where Oriental labor was compet- 
ing with white, the states passed discriminatory measures 
against the former. Laws were passed forbidding aliens, ex- 
cept those who declared their intentions to become citizens, 
to own or require any interest in land within the state. The 
penalty was forfeiture of the land to the state and criminal 
punishment of those conveying title in violation of law. While 
the Supreme Court has held in Traux us. Raich (1915)98 that 
the alien had the right to earn a living by following ordinary 
occupations, it was held in Terrace us. Thompson (1923)" that 
each state had power to deny to aliens the right to own land 
witbin its borders. A modification of the holding came in 1948, 
however, when in Oyamu us. it was held that a 
father alien could convey to his minor son, who was a citizen of 
the United States, lands within the State of California and in- 
sofar as the California Alien Land Law applied to the minor, 
it deprived him of equal protection of the law and of his privi- 
leges and immunities as an American citizen. 
During the recent war, deportation of enemy aliens 
brought many civiI rights issues to court attention. Pending 
deportation, persons of Japanese ancestry, even though 
American citizens, were ordered to observe an evening cur- 
few, which was upheld in Hirabayashi us. U.S. (1943).lo1 In 
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two lower court decisions, the Courts took opposing views, 
One1" reasoned that Congress might consider all the area as 
an actual military arsenal under martial control; the other103 
took the position that no constitutional power existed for 
making a distinction relating to citizens on the basis of their 
race or color. The Supreme Court took approximately the 
position of the first district judge, stating through Chief 
Justice Stone: Y e  cannot close our eyes to the fact, demon- 
strated by experience, that in time of war residents having 
ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be of a 
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry. 
Nor can we deny that Congress and the military authorities 
acting with its authorization have constitutional powers to 
appraise the danger in the light of facts of public, notoriety. 
We decide only the issue as we have defined it-we decide 
that the curfew order as applied and at the time it was ap- 
plied was within the boundaries of the war power."' Un- 
doubtedly, treatment accorded Japanese-Americans during 
World War II constitutes the most discordant note in the 
recent expansion of civil liberties. 
Free Speech and Picketing 
A civil right that owes its origin and development to this 
century is the right to picket, which the new Court has 
held to be a form of free speech protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While Texas and other states had upheld peace- 
ful picketing long prior to 1937,1°4 it was in that year that 
the Supreme Court in Senn us. Tite Layers Union (1937)lo5 
upheld the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute legalizing 
peaceful picketing. "Clearly,)' observed Justice Brandeis, 
"the means which the statute authorizes-picketing and 
publicity-are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Members of a union might without special statutory author- 
ization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, 
for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Con- 
stitution." Thus was born the implication that picketing was 
a form of free speech with which the state could not legally 
interfere. 
C a r h  us. Californhz (1940)lo6 and Thornhill vs. Alubama 
(1940)10T each involved municipal ordinances to prohibit 
picketing on city streets. The Court held both ordinances 
unconstitutional in that "dissemination of information con- 
cerning . . . labor disputes must be regarded as within that 
area of free discussion guaranteed by the Constitution," 
In American Federation of Labor us. Swing (1941)'08 the 
defendant's employees were satisfied with their employment, 
but the union wanted a closed shop and commenced picket- 
ing, In the state court, Swing was granted an injunction, but 
the United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that a 
ban on free discussion was inconsistent with the guarantee 
of freedom of speech even though there was no employer- 
employee controversy, 
In Milkwagon Drivers' Union us. Meadowmoor Dairies 
(1941)'09 the court held, however, that a state court might 
lawfully enjoin "piclceting enmeshed with violence." Trivial 
rough incidents, however, are insufficient, though past mis- 
conduct may lend s ac i en t  inference of future violence to 
warrant an injun~tion.~'~ 
In Carpenters' and Joiners' Union us. Ritters' Cafe (1942)'1' 
defendant owned a cafe in Houston and started constructing a 
building several miles away. His contractor used non-union 
labor, and the union started picketing his cafe. The state 
granted an injunction, and the Court upheld this action, 
restricting picketing to the area of dispute. The Court further 
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upheld in 1949 an injunction issued by a Missouri court 
restraining peaceful picketing when in violation of the state's 
restraint of trade statutes.l12 
Limits of Free Speech-Criticism of Court and Country 
World War I caused unprecedented consideration of free 
speech. Even during the Civil War, the efficacy of the Bill 
of Rights in war time had been c o n b e d  in Ex Parte Milli- 
gun (1866).'13 In 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act 
forbidding the wilful making of false reports with intent to 
interfere with the operations of military forces and training. 
The Sedition Act of 1918 created new penalties for uttering 
language disloyal to the United States or its form of govern- 
ment. The former was tested in Schenck us, U. S. (1919)F4 in 
which appellant contended the Espionage Act violated the 
First Amendment and was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice 
Holmes wrote a unanimous opinion stating that free speech 
had never been absolute at any time. "Free speech would 
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panicy' even in peace and, when a nation is at war, 
"many things that might be said in time of peace are such 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be en- 
dured so long as men fight . . . The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and 
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has the right to prevent. It is a question of promixity and 
degree." The latter statute was passed on in Abrams us. U. S. 
(1919)y115 where the Court reviewed a conviction of defend- 
ants charged with publication of pamphlets denouncing the 
"capitalistic government of the United States." The majority 
opinion upheld the conviction and the statute, but Justice 
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Holmes, in one of his most famous opinions, dissented: 
". . . but when men have realized that time has upset many 
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of their o m  conduct that 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and 
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely 
can be carried out. . . ." 
Gitlow us. New YorkF6 already mentioned, is of import- 
ance primarily for extending the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state action invading freedom of speech. 
About two thousand cases involving the Espionage Act 
arose in the lower Federal Courts during World War IF7 
and hundreds more have been tried under Sedition and 
other Acts since that time. Undoubtedly the trial gaining 
widest attention in recent years has been that of the twelve 
communists convicted in the United States Court House in 
Foley Square, New York, by Judge HaroId R. Medina for 
advocating overthrow of the United States government as 
early as circumstances would permit, contrary to Congres- 
sional legi~lation.''~ In his charge1" to the jury, Judge Medina 
made it clear that belief in and advocacy of a system of 
government unlike our own was in every sense permissible, 
and it is through incitement to action that the evil lies. Un- 
doubtedly more will be heard from this case in the appellate 
courts. 
Also of interest to free speech is the right to criticize the 
Court's action in pending litigation. In Bridges us. California 
(1941)120 defendant sent a telegram to the Secretary of Labor 
stating that enforcement of a state court's current decision 
would tie up the entire Pacific Coast and that he did not 
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intend to abide by it. Held in contempt by the court, the 
defendant contended on appeal that he was within his rights 
thus to speak. In sustaining his view, the Court commented 
that it was not enough to abridge speech to show that a sub- 
stantive evil would result-but that the evil must be itself 
serious, and that the likelihood of danger was a question of 
degree for which no formula could be captured, 
In Pennekamp us. Flolida (1946yZ1 the editor of the Miami 
Herald published a series of editoriaIs after eight rape indict- 
ments had been dismissed. Accompanying cartoons showed a 
robed compliant judge handling a decree to a huge criminal 
figure with another marked "pubIic interest" vainly protest- 
ing. Again emphasizing the necessity of criticism, the 
Supreme Court overruled the conviction with the candid 
remark that: 'Whether the threat to the impartial and 
orderly administration of justice must be a clear and present 
or a grave and immediate danger, a real and substantial 
threat-one which is close and direct, or one which disturbs 
the court's sense of fairness depends upon a choice of 
words." 
In 1947 a Corpus Christi publisher made comment that a 
county judge had wrought a gross miscarriage of justice and 
a "raw deal" and that he would not know whether justice 
was done, not being a member of the bar. As defendant he 
insisted he intended no disrespect, but merely wished to 
quicken the conscience of the judge and make him careful in 
the discharge of his duties. Again the Supreme Court held 
there was no clear and present danger, and that the defend- 
ant's conviction for contempt would not stand.lZ2 
In I942 in U .  S, us. Pelle~,"~ we find a defendant much 
more facile in attacking American institutions than the 
above three. William Dudley PelIey published the Galilean 
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Magazine which not only criticized President Roosevelt and 
his New Deal, but also strongly attacked the British and 
made expressions of gloom about our war preparedness. Obvi- 
ously one could not be punished for criticizing the President 
or New Deal, for that would include the most of us, and 
criticism of the British has been a sacred American preroga- 
tive since 1775. But Pelley interwove such statements with a 
seditious web of propaganda designed to depress military 
morale. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was a 
clear and present danger and the Supreme Court gave its 
tacit approval by refusing to review the case. 
Conclusion 
The treatment of civil rights in this paper has left many 
fields untouched, particularly domestic relations,lZ4 newly 
created tests for naturalizati~n,l"~ and many others.lZ6 
In appraising the cases, someT2' will feel with Justice 
Harlan that our Supreme Court has prolonged raciaI conflict 
by allowing the seeds of race hate to be planted under the 
sanction of law. The Southern realist1" will more likely feel, 
however, that when legislation runs counter to emotions 
rising to a religious pitch, the Court has usually acted with 
prudence and wise restraint. In many respects it is remark- 
able that a system devised in the Eighteenth Century for a 
sparsely settled agricultural nation has so well coped with 
the needs and complexities of today's highly integrated 
technological society. In general, America can be proud that 
even while fighting for her very survival, she has preserved 
her basic civil liberties. 
The new civil rights program of the President may some- 
day be hailed as the beginning of true democracy;'" it as 
likely could break down, like the Fifteenth Amendment, for 
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coming too soon; it may aggravate rather than heal, Today's 
society requires closer surveillance of those who would 
undennine our government, but excessive surveillance is the 
beginning of the police state. Even the most rabid regula- 
tionist would fear a government like that in George Orwell's 
recent satire, Nineteen Eighty-four. 
Through the ages the crude and bestial instincts of the 
mob have succeeded in destroying the delicate achievements 
of human endeavor; no nation can consider itself immune. 
War and its aftermath create a social context poisonous to 
the sensitive plant of freedom.130 We must renew our trust 
in the saving grace of wider sympathy and tolerance and 
greater understanding, and recognize that human progress 
is made in light and not in darkness, if the hard-won gains 
of the human spirit are to survive. 
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